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The Third Best Choice: An Essay on Law
and History
THEODORE

by
Y.

BLUMOFF*

The use of history to reach "correct" solutions to legal problems is
commonplace in the legal profession. Courts routinely turn to historical
sources-framers' or legislators' intent, as well as their own historiographyl-to resolve or give texture to the resolution of legal issues. As the
courts use history in decisionmaking, so lawyers must engage in the process of recovering history, regardless of how myopic, inelegant, and
poorly crafted the final product may be.2 Dean Sandalow, denying that
history provides clear-cut answers and, thus, denying its capacity to serve
as a useful restraint on judicial decisionmaking, nonetheless defends the
process. 3 He describes the jurisprudential use of history as a search "for
a better understanding of the choices that must now be made and of the
risks attendant upon alternative solutions." 4 Justice Holmes goes still
further in ascribing importance to the historical method. He allows that
historical continuity is "not a duty, it is only a necessity." 5 The conclu*
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1. Although I focus primarily on the United States Supreme Court's effort to capture
the elusive intent of framers and ratifiers, for the purposes of this Essay I make no distinction
between that traditional sort of history and what I have called the Court's historiography,
namely, use of its own precedent. In terms of the use of history as a dissonance reduction
technique, there is no discernible difference. See infra Part III.
2. On this issue, Wiecek, Clio as Hostage: The United States Supreme Courtand the Uses
of History, 24 CAL. W.L. REv. 227, 230 (1988), largely summarizes the position taken in
Kelly, Clio and the Court: An Illicit Love Affair, 1965 Sup. Cr. REV. 119, 125-28.
3. Sandalow, ConstitutionalInterpretation,79 MICH. L. REV. 1033, 1070 (1981).
4. Id
5. 0. W. HOLMES, COLLECTED ESSAYS 191 (quoted in Wofford, The Blinding Light:
The Uses of History in ConstitutionalInterpretation,31 U. CHI. L. REv. 502, 530 (1964) (date

[5371

THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 41

sion that necessity requires us to root in the past the answers to contemporary legal questions is perhaps more correct than Justice Holmes could
have appreciated. Central to this Essay is a preliminary effort to define
'6
Justice Holmes' "necessity."
Even as history increasingly engages lawyers and judges in their
daily business, its use is increasingly under attack. The most sophisticated attack comes from those identified with the Critical Legal Studies
movement, and more particularly, those schooled in the methods of contextualism and hermeneutics. 7 The thrust of this attack is that history
demands a creative interaction between the researcher and the materials,
and therefore cannot reveal itself unambiguously. Under this view, our
effort to find historically determinate answers is hopeless and the best
researchers can achieve is discovery of the context within which decisions are made. Thereafter, the theory states, our own predilections, the
lenses through which we achieve clarity, may produce alternatives, but
no answers. 8 In the end, judicial decisions are determined not by history,
but by idiosyncratic considerations having more to do with personal,
political, economic, and sociological values. 9
omitted)). The author found the Wofford citation to Holmes unavailable, if not erroneous.

The quote is from 0. W.

HOLMES,

Law in Science and Science in Law, in COLLECTED

LEGAL

PAPERS 139 (1920).
6. Just what Holmes meant when he wrote that history is "only a necessity" illustrates a
problem that plagues historians. Holmes could have meant at least two things. He may have
stated a truism. As the ongoing products of history, we are helpless to escape a present shaped
by the past; we cannot flee that which precedes us. Alternatively, he may have had something
far richer in mind; he may have stated his belief that history is a treasure that must be mined to
give continuity to the present. The problem illustrated is that without some greater attention
to context, we cannot know the status of an idea from historical text alone. See Skinner,
Meaning and Understandingin the History of Ideas, 8 HIST. & THEORY 3, 38 (1969).
7. "Contextualism" and "hermeneutics" are processes that I can only woefully underdefine in a footnote. Perhaps the leading "contextualist" is Quentin Skinner. The gist of
Skinner's position, summarized supra note 6, is that historical meaning cannot be gleaned from
examination of text alone. Rather, the researcher must steep herself in context to determine
the possible meanings of text. Much of Skinner's work and responses thereto are summarized
in Q. SKINNER, MEANING AND CONTEXT: QUENTIN SKINNER AND His CRITICS (J. Tully ed.
1989). The discipline of hermeneutics, which originated in post-structural, European philosophy, defies simplistic definitions. Suffice it to say that while its practitioners share the epistemologist's concern about meaning and understanding, they tend to view more critically the
"interpreters" role in the process of determining meaning. In-depth discussions of hermeneutics are contained in Hoy, Interpreting the Law: Hermeneutical and PoststructuralistPerspectives, 58 S. CAL. L. REv. 135 (1985); and Garet, Comparative Normative Hermeneutics:
Scripture,Literature,and Constitution, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 35 (1985). Perhaps more accessible
discussions are contained in Kelley, Hermes, Clio, Themis: HistoricalInterpretationand Legal
Hermeneutics, 55 J. MOD. HIST. 644, 661-65 (1983). The process is summarized in Nelson,
History and Neutrality in ConstitutionalAdjudication, 72 VA. L. REV. 1237, 1241-45 (1986).
8. Skinner, supra note 6, at 49.
9. See, e.g., Kennedy, Freedom and Constraintin Adjudication: A CriticalPhenomenol-
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The logic of the hermeneutic-contextualist position counsels against
the entire historical project in the legal context. History is not instrumental. Because historical determinacy is itself impossible to attain, the
use of history as a device to constrain judges is impossible.10 Moreover,
convincing ourselves that determinate historical answers are useful as
constraining forces when such answers are literally impossible to attain
works immeasurable harm on a public whose respect all in the legal profession-and especially judges-require. Sooner or later, the public will
find us out. Thus, if the basis of the attack is correct and if its logic is
followed to its necessary conclusion, the best and most honorable course
to follow is to confess our inability to constrain judges, abandon the technique, and play straight with the public. 1
The thesis of this Essay is that our use of history is as essential and
unavoidable as conclusive answers are irretrievable. Irretrievability exists whether the historical reality sought results from a survey of traditional historical materials in an effort to recapture original
understanding, or from a common-law effort to discover the Court's own
history of an issue. In either case, however, the need to attempt to recover historical truths is perceived as essential. 12 I subscribe, for the
most part, to the contextualist premise that we cannot recover sufficient
historical data on issues that matter to make history determinate in the
solution of current legal problems. "Issues that matter" is a key limitation. It is no doubt true that on most issues, most of the time, a kind of
public professional consensus exists. As a practical matter, we could not
tolerate a situation in -which all issues are disputed. Those cases that
arouse public and professional passion, that cause us to appraise and
reappraise the Court's legitimacy, such as Roe v. Wade,13 Griswold v.
ogy, 36 J. LEGAL EDUC. 518 (1986) (arguing that the convergence of a judge's perception of
the law and "HIWTCO" ("how-I-want-to-come-out") is heavily influenced by her values and
personal and ethical considerations).
10. See Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of Interpretivism and Neutral Principles, 96 HARv. L. REv. 781, 784-85, 802 (1983).
11. Although I do not subscribe to this conclusion, I propose that "straight" in this context may include more legislative control of federal courts' jurisdiction. Cf M. PERRY, THE
CONSTITUTION, THE COURTS, AND HUMAN RIGHTS: AN INQUIRY INTO LEGITIMACY OF
CONSTITUTIONAL POLICYMAKING BY THE JUDICIARY 128-35 (1982) (arguing that Congress

has the power to control "noninterpretive" policymaking, judicial review, by limiting the jurisdiction of the federal courts).
12. I do not intend to produce a monograph explicating in general or defending a particular historical method, although I address methodology briefly in Part II.More detailed, firstrate works that address historiography and methodology exist in ample supply. See, e.g., Clinton, Original Understanding,Legal Realism, and the Interpretationof "This Constitution," 72
IOWA L. REv. 1177 (1987); Nelson, supra note 7; Sandalow, supra note 3.
13. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).

THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 41

Connecticut,14 and Brown v. Board of Education,15 the betes noires of the
right, or Bowers v. Hardwick,16 and Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 17 on the left, are rarely susceptible to resolution along unambiguous,
historically determinate, shared principles.
Although we may desire historically determinate answers, at least
on some issues, 18 that is out of the question: the past stubbornly eludes
our best efforts at recapture. Our second choice may be to isolate historical trends that are sufficient to solve the present problem and allow us to
feel confident about the future effect of today's disputable decision. That
option, too, is highly controversial; difficulties include the tendency to
confuse historical cause and effect, which undermines our confidence in
the endeavor, and the impossibility of prediction. We use history, then,
as a third best choice: to reduce the cognitive dissonance-post-decisional psychological tension--created by today's decision, to "prove"
that that decision is rooted in the past and to provide a necessary link
between a past without the current decision and the future as affected by
it. The need for such proof and such links is an inescapable demand we
place on ourselves.
This Essay is about cognitive dissonance theory and historical continuity. The question that inspired this Essay is a simple one: How can
the justices, in the course of deciding two issues from the same jurisprudential genre, examine and reexamine the same historical setting-the
framers' vision of the political theory that underlay the Constitutionand, at least from the historians' viewpoint, come away with embarrassingly contradictory conclusions? What did they do with their old notecards, their old precedents? The search for an answer to this question led
me to consider the work of cognitive dissonance theorists.
This Essay begins with an archetypal example of the Supreme
Court's apparently careless use of history. The example is purposefully
14. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
15. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
16. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
17. 109 S. Ct. 3040 (1989).
18. Because we identify certain issues as politically "liberal" or "conservative," proponents of each side would want to invent a doctrine that permits them to employ framers' intent
only on those issues that suit their predilections and for which the framers provided the politically acceptable solution. For example, conservatives would use framers' intent to argue
against Roe and Griswold; liberals might use framers' intent to argue against a decision like
Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986), which seems to undermine legislative flexibility and
clearly cuts against the intent of the framers, as expressed in THE FEDERALIST No. 77, at 459
(A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961). This theory with respect to separation of powers cases is
discussed at length in Blumoff, Illusions of ConstitutionalDecisionmaking: Politics and the
Tenure Powers in the Court, 73 IOWA L. REV. 1079 (1988).
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drawn, not from the emotionally wrenching jurisprudence of fundamental rights, but from the more sober jurisprudence of political theory,
namely, separation of powers. Part II highlights the recent historiography of law and history to describe the ineradicable problems with our
first and second best choices-the search for historical determinacy and
the identification of historical trends. Part III discusses cognitive dissonance theory and analyzes Bowsher v. Synar1 9 under this view. The Essay concludes that the current debate about the instrumental use of
history in law is both healthy and misguided: healthy because the debate
draws our attention to a much used (and misused) methodology; misguided because its premises are oblivious to the psychological demand
that the game go on. When the debate overlooks this point, it prevents
us from pursuing two more fruitful endeavors: learning to use history
more precisely and understanding the legitimate, if attenuated, role that
20
it can play in resolving persistent legal disputes.
I.

An Illustrative Case

Among those who study the Supreme Court's separation of powers
jurisprudence, acknowledgement of an outcome determinative approach
to these issues is common. 21 The approach in some ways reflects a kind
of judicial schizophrenia: successive majorities of the Court have been
downright contradictory in their use of history. Consider the following
descriptions of the framers' intent from two fairly recent decisions. In
Bowsher v. Synar, the case that struck down the Gramm-Rudman budget
reduction proposal, the Court opined that "Itihe Framers provided a vigorous Legislative Branch and a separate and wholly independent Executive Branch .... -22 A decade earlier a unanimous Court reached the
opposite conclusion about framers' intent in United States v. Nixon, 23 the
19. 478 U.S. 714 (1986).
20. I make no claim here that cognitive dissonance alone explains the work of the Court;
such a claim would understate ludicrously the forces that operate on judges. Moreover, I do
not attempt to answer what may be the question: how does history, as a means of reducing
cognitive dissonance, work in relation to other forces, such as logic and reason, moral authority, and'so on? The answer to that question would require me to do precisely what I know I
cannot do and what I suspect none of us is able to do, namely, analyze the deep-seated motives
of judges. My thesis, as the reader will discover quickly, is more modest.
21. See Blumoff, supra note 18, at 1151; Chemeinsky, A Paradox Without a Principle:A
Comment on the Burger Court's Jurisprudence in Separation of Powers Cases, 60 S. CAL. L.
REv. 1083, 1111 (1987) ("[The Burger] Court used a different method of interpretation depending on whether the President or Congress was being sued.").
22. 478 U.S. at 722 (emphasis added); accord Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 116
(1926) (concluding that the three branches of government "should be kept separate in all cases
in which they were not expressly blended").
23. 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
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Watergate tape case, stating that "the separate powers [of government]
'24
were not intended to operate with absolute independence."
Bowsher's and Nixon's conclusions about founders' intent, hermetic
separation versus shared authority, are irreconcilable as history. There is
no doubt, however, that we can reconcile the outcomes of the cases using
traditional, nonhistorical criteria. 25 In fact, one could argue that recourse to history to answer the questions raised in these two cases was
senseless; both addressed issues for which there is no constitutional text
and about which the framers apparently gave little or no thought. The
Court's historical dicta, to the extent that doctrinal distinctions are avail26
able, amount to little more than ex cathedra canonizations of history.
Despite our ability to distinguish issues based on legal doctrine, the
Court believes that historical bases for its opinions are necessary. Why
else would it invariably couch its opinions in the language of historical
determinacy? To that question this Essay now turns.
II.

The Shortcomings of Traditional Theory

The inconsistent descriptions of framers' intent, left unexplained,
generate serious concern about the Court's competence and even its
members' mendacity. For example, on the same day that the Court decided Bowsher and embraced its hermetic approach to governing, it decided another separation of powers case, Commodity Futures Trading
Commissions v. Schor,27 which involved a statutory device that permitted
non-Article III tribunals to adjudicate state law contract claims as a part
of an action for "reparations" brought by a disgruntled commodities in24. Id. at 707. See Morrison v. Olson, 108 S. Ct. 2597, 2620 (1988) (citing Nixon and
stating that the Court has never interpreted the Constitution as requiring absolute independence among the branches). For an example of a single case in which the Court lets loose its
schizophrenic gyrations about "separateness" and "independence," see Buckley v. Valeo, 424
U.S. 1, 20-24 (1976).
25. See generally Blumoff, supra note 18, at 1172-77 (reconciling Morrison v. Olson and
earlier separation of power decisions concluding that at least in some circumstances Congress
can both delegate executive authority and participate in the executive branch's removal function); Feld, Separation of PoliticalPowers: Boundariesor Balance?. 21 GA. L. REV. 171 (1986)
(suggesting that decision making should be shared by Congress and the President and "Court
intervention is appropriate.., only to prevent one political branch from upsetting the balance
and excluding the other from the decision making process"); Strauss, Formal and Functional
Approaches to Separation-of-PowersQuestions-A Foolish Inconsistency?, 72 CORNELL L. REV.
488 (1987) (attempting to reconcile the Court's apparently contradictory decisions in Bowsher
and Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833 (1986)).
26. Professor Wiecek refers to this canonization process as the Court's power "to declare
history [rightly or wrongly] and then compel the rest of society to conform its behavior to that
understanding." Wiecek, supra note 2, at 227-28.
27. 478 U.S. 833 (1986).
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vestor against a trader. Unlike Bowsher, Schor's majority disavowed
bright lines and emphasized the need for flexibility in governing, that is,
for sharing governing authority, among the branches.28 The dissent, by
contrast, quoted Bowsher's "wholly independent" conclusion and counseled in favor of "[t]he fundamental necessity of maintaining each of the
three general departments of government entirely free from the control
or coercive influence ... of the others. '2 9 The majority ignored that
historically based warning. Instead, it paid self-conscious respect to preserving future legislative options. Bright-line rules might, the majority
feared, "unduly constrict Congress' ability to take needed and innovative
30
action."
Although we can and do distinguish the cases on doctrinal grounds,
neither an originalist nor a contextualist approach can adequately explain the inconsistent historical descriptions of intent in Bowsher, Nixon,
and the Schor dissent. Nor can we explain the different approaches of
Bowsher and Schor in terms of the need for predictive certainty. Something beyond ordinary legal explanations is required.
A.

Limitations of Historical Methodology

The unsophisticated originalist cannot reconcile Bowsher and Nixon.
In his now well publicized 1985 address to the Federalist Society, 31 then
Attorney General Edwin Meese, attempting to "depoliticize the law"
(and ignoring the irony contained in his characterization of that effort as
putting forward the "administration's approach" to constitutional interpretation) urged a jurisprudence of "original intentions. ' 32 His approach
begins with the document itself and moves from an isolation of specific
textual meaning to particular principles encapsulated in text to general
principles about the political system.3 3 Acknowledging that interpreta28. d at 857.
29. Id at 860 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 725, quoting
Humphrey's Ex'r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 629 (1935)).
1 30. Schor, 478 U.S. at 851. The Court opted for a balancing test in lieu of deduction
based on a prioni conceptions of the proper locus of governing functions. For thoughtful critiques of the balancing approach, see Aleinikoff, ConstitutionalLaw in the Age of Balancing, 96
YALE L.J. 943, 1004 (1987) ("Balancing has turned us away from the Constitution, supplying

'reasonable' policymaking in lieu of theoretical investigations of rights, principles and structures."); Nagel, The Formulaic Constitution, 84 MICH. L. REv. 165 (1985) (arguing that the
Court's formulae for deciding issues that bring values into conflict alienate the public).
31. The speech, delivered before the Washington, D.C., Chapter of the Federalist Society,
lawyers division, is printed in 19 U.C. DAVIS L. Rv. 22 (1985).
32. Id at 23, 29.
33. Id. at 24-25.
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tion is not a mechanical process, he suggests that on some issues judicial
review "requires an appeal to reason and discretion. ' 34
Anyone who uses a process that demands text as a starting point
must have a difficult time with Nixon and Bowsher. The major issues in
these cases--executive privilege and removal without impeachment, respectively-were adjudicated without reference to constitutional text.
The former Attorney General acknowledges that issues arise in the context of constitutional ambiguity, in which case the rule of construction is
"interpret[] and appl[y] in a manner so as to at least not contradict the
text of the Constitution itself."' 35 But our two cases exceed mere "ambiguity." That noun describes a different context entirely. It applies only
when two interpretations are possible; here none is possible, because
there is no text to begin with.
Meese's interpretive scheme must condemn Nixon and Bowsher. He
writes: "The power to declare acts of Congress and laws of the states
null and void is truly awesome. This power must be used when the Constitution clearly speaks. It should not be used when the Constitution
does not."' 36 Consistency with this theory of original intentions would
have required the Justice Department to argue that Bowsher presented a
nonjusticiable political question. The Reagan administration, however,
through the Solicitor General, participated in the litigation and argued
that the statute was unconstitutional. 37 Politically driven conceptions of
constitutional interpretation will not explain Nixon's and Bowsher's discordant views of original intentions.
More sophisticated explanations of original intention fare little better. In a recent article, Professor Kay attempts to rescue constitutional
original intentions jurisprudence from the contextualist-hermeneutic
lance. 38 Among the points he makes in defense of originalism is that
finding original intent does not require an abstract exercise devoted to
recovering the meaning of a particular constitutional provision; rather, it
demands that the judge determine whether particular conduct is more
34. Id. at 26.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 29. There is an unintended irony when this quote is juxtaposed to the very next
sentence in the speech. There, he argued that Marbury v. Madison supported his position that
if we want change, the amendment process, and not the courts, is the proper channel. The
irony, of course, is that § 13 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 was hardly an example of the Constitution "clearly speak[ing]" to the constitutionality of the act, one of his administration's requirements for judicial review.
37. Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 716, 719 n.1 (1986).
38. Kay, Adherence to the OriginalIntentions in ConstitutionalAdjudication: Three Objections and Response, 82 Nw. U.L. REV. 226 (1988).
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likely than not consistent with original intentions.3 9 Kay recognizes an
insurmountable problem with interpretation of issues that fall outside the
"central uncontroversial core of meaning" shared by the majority of
lawmakers. 40 He notes that "[i]n the areas of application where no lawmaking majority agreement exists, there would be no relevant constitutional rule."' 4 1 Where no rule exists there exists no relevant majority
whose intent we can discern. 42
Even when there is text, the brand of original intentions he advocates has difficulties. Describing the task of recovering original intentions, Kay writes:
The concern is simply which of two contesting interpretations is more
likely consistent with the original intention. The answer will often be
presumptively clear from the language the constitution-makers chose.
Beyond that, it will be enough in most cases to learn what people, at
the time, generally meant when they used certain language and what
43
people involved in the process of enactment thought was at issue.
Kay's statement vastly understates the scope of the problem and
summons a number of responses. First, the notion of "presumptive"
clarity erects a procedural device to avoid the very sort of ambiguity inherent in history. 44 Given special rules to eliminate ambiguity, we will
find none. More importantly, it assumes what it cannot prove: that
there is clarity in the text on issues that call into question the Court's
role. In other words, if we accept the idea that the Constitution contains
an answer to the debatable proposition before the Court, we are predisposed to find that answer in the text; we are committed a priori 'to the
existence of an answer in the text. Our preconceptions "tend to act as
determinants of what we think and perceive." 45 The conclusion of this
Essay suggests this observation may be overemphasized, but is nonetheless correct.
There is a second problem with Kay's assertion. His distinction
between general meaning and particular intentions is not only revealing
but erosive to his case. To the extent that we must determine what people "generally meant," Kay concedes a major point to the contextualist39. Id at 243-44.
40. Id at 249.
41. Id. at 250.
42. I am developing this idea at length in another work. Blumoff, JudicialReview, Foreign Affairs and Legislative Standing (unpublished manuscript on file at the Hastings Law
Journal).
43. Kay, supra note 38, at 250.
44. M. TUsHNET, RED, WHITE, AND BLUE: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF CONSTrrUTIONAL LAW 37-39 (1988).

45. Skinner, supra note 6, at 6.
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hermeneutic position: language and understanding change over time,
and the best we can hope for is an approximation of contemporaneous
meaning, or various alternatives of meaning, based on the context of the
document and not the document itself.4 6 Thus, Kay's own understanding recognizes that the text alone is not sufficient to capture meaning;
that understanding undermines his conclusion, at least in part.
Related to that observation is a third. Describing the task in terms
of ordinary standards of proof, "more likely than not," appears more
manageable than discovering intent generally, but that appearance may
be illusory. In reality, the standard obscures the practical difficulty. Let
me illustrate. Discussing the problem of finding authoritative intent
when a variety of groups have spoken and determining which voice controls within the authoritative group, Kay writes that the problem is "intractable only if there are multiple and totally contradictory
intentions."'4 7 Otherwise, the language in the text ordinarily "suggests a
common core of meaning shared by all."' 48 Determining intent grows
increasingly problematic as the issue moves further from the common
core, even if we assume intent can be conclusively established in his more
limited sense. 49 That increasing difficulty is precisely the problem: Kay
fails to acknowledge or appreciate fully that the battles we wage on issues
that matter are fought at the margin of common understanding. Kay
parries this response by attacking a premise of the hermeneutic approach. In the course of rejecting the legal hermeneuticist's observation
that "variability of meaning is a necessary consequence of the multiplicity of readers," 50 Kay distinguishes literary and legal interpretation.
The literary critic, he writes, views a novel interpretation as a part of the
job description. 5 1 He contrasts the lawyer's job as one of finding only the
"best" legal interpretation. This more limited search supposedly en52
hances the constraints on the legal profession.
46.

For discussions of the notion that meaning is affected both by language and the time

in which it was created, see J.G.A. POCOCK, POLITICS,

LANGUAGE AND TIME

(1971); Skinner,

supra note 6.
47. Kay, supra note 38, at 248.
48. Id.
49. But see Brest, The Misconceived Quest for Original Understanding,60 B.U.L. REV.
204, 223 (1980) (arguing that "some major constitutional doctrines lie beyond [the] pale" of a
moderate originalist approach to interpretation); Wofford, supra note 5, at 508-11 ("The essential point is that what was accepted at Philadelphia and later ratified was a group of words, not
the intended interpretation of those words, whether expressed or unexpressed.").
50. Kay, supra note 38, at 237.
51.
52.

Id. at 238-39.
Id.

March 1990]

LAW AND HISTORY

In the routine practice of law, we do not challenge the applicability
of every rule through novel construction. On issues that matter, however, Kay's more modest interpretive goal is far from obvious, even if we
concede that his description is accurate in "ordinary" contexts. The lawyers who represented the plaintiffs in Roe, Griswold, and Brown were successful in part precisely because they found compelling legal meanings
outside the common core of shared legal understanding, although within
our shared understanding of what it means to be an American.5 3 Thus,
to conclude that the hermeneutic insight fails to comport with our everyday ability to communicate with a single determinate meaning does not
undermine the hermeneutic argument.5 4 Rather, it suggests to me that
deciding legal disputes in these difficult cases occurs at the periphery of
understanding, precisely where one is least likely to recover shared understanding among the original, authoritative group whose intent purports to count as a normative matter, 55 and precisely where a discussion
of standards of proof is least helpful.
Kay makes several additional arguments that purport to demonstrate that hermeneutic insights are overstated.5 6 He claims that if we
concede that "some immediate communication is possible," then the difference between "speaking and listening or writing and reading" is only
one of degree; the same kind of problem arises whether the communication gap is "minutes or days to decades or centuries. 57T This is incorrect.
First we cannot question the Constitution, for example, to determine the
drafters' or ratifiers' intent. We can, however, question the speaker or
reasonably contemporary document drafter in an effort to refine our un53. See Dworkin, From Bork to Kennedy, N.Y. REv. BooKs, Dec. 17, 1987, at 37, 40.
54. Kay, supra note 38, at 241-42 (arguing that it is not always impossible to infer "a
determinate meaning from a sequence of words uttered in a particular context").
55." In the last section of his article, Kay addresses the normative issue of whether we
ought to be bound by that intent. Opining that this is the most difficult of the questions he
raises, he concludes that the answer requires a moral and political "evaluation of the relative
importance of competing values: the value of flexibility and adaptability on the one hand, and
the value of predictability and stability on the other." Id at 291-92. It is perhaps here that
Kay and I are furthest at odds. As I demonstrate in the final section, it is on this very issue
that history can make the greatest contribution.
56. Kay also asserts that the very breadth of the hermeneutic claim, that one cannot
recover the intended meaning of statements remote in culture or time, is undermined "by the
fact that history is a well-established discipline to which thousands of sensible people" have
devoted their careers. Id at 251-52. But each generation does reexamine and rewrite history
for itself precisely because the process is in the final analysis subjective, a point even the least
contextual historiographers fondly point out. See R.G. COLLINGWOOD, ESSAYS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY 138 (W. Debbins ed. 1965); J.H. HEXTER, REAPPRAISALS IN HISTORY
11-13 (1961). Rewriting occurs because the received wisdom changes with perspective. In the
end, that is all hermeneutics tell us and that is enough.
57. Kay, supra note 38, at 251.
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derstanding of her text. 58 Second, Kay's statement ignores his own implicit understanding that language changes over time. One need only
contrast the definition of "liberal" in the late nineteenth century with its
meaning in the 1960s and again with its connotation in the 1988 presi59
dential election.
The final and most compelling reason for challenging Kay's assertion is that neither the framers nor ratifiers ever dreamed of having any
intent with respect to many of these issues that matter. They were concerned with the issues of their day, not ours. 60 If intent is the touchstone
of judicial review, we must all agree that Griswold, for instance, was not
only wrongly but illegitimately decided. It is absurd to suppose that the
fourteenth amendment's ratifiers harbored any authoritative purpose or
intent with respect to reproductive freedom. Yet, an originalist as interpretively stingy as Judge Robert Bork, when questioned during his confirmation hearings, hinted that he might find a constitutional handle with
which he could validate Griswold today. 6 1 Could a reasonably representative majority of the body politic vote to obstruct a married couple's use
of contraceptives today? If the answer to that question is no, and if, as I
suspect, a supermajority of us agree that Griswold, in perspective, is a
good decision, then either history as ordinarily practiced in the courtroom is misdirected, or we need to find another use for it.62
58. Professor Kay apparently has forgotten the old children's game of "telephone" or
"gossip." Only our ability to question the original speaker permits us to recover the idea
communicated.
59. On the changeable definition of "liberalism" in American history, see R. HOFSTADTER, THE AGE OF REFORM 12-15 (1955). On liberalism in the 1960s and 1970s, see T.
Lowi, THE END OF LIBERALISM 50-52 (2d. ed. 1979).
60. Skinner, supra note 6, at 50. Writing in a more general context, Skinner concludes
that
the classic texts cannot be concerned with our questions and answers, but only with
their own ....
[T]here simply are no perennial problems in philosophy: there are
only individual answers to individual questions, with as many different answers as
there are questions, and as many different questions as there are questioners.
Id.
One could respond by noting that, for the most part, Skinner was concerned with issues in
the history ideas, and not with a search for specific answers to narrow legal questions. That is
a distinction without a difference. Skinner is concerned with the same kind of divisive issues
and conclusions derived from historical examination as are lawyers. The notion of classic texts
certainly includes the Constitution and The Federalist Papers, the routine stuff of Court-practiced constitutional history.
61. Nomination of Robert H. Bork to be Assoc. Justice of the Supreme Court of the U.S.:
HearingsBefore the Sen. Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 115, 118 (1989) (testimony of Robert Bork).
62. The last section of this Essay addresses the latter, see infra notes 145-61 and accompanying text.
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The originalists, then, cannot explain the apparent inconsistency in
recovering original intent in cases like Nixon or Bowsher. On the one
hand, as nontext cases, originalist premises must condemn the Court for
exercising judicial review: one cannot locate majoritarian intent when
the majority has not spoken. On the other, even the sophisticated
originalist position cannot cope with utterly inconsistent conclusions.
The recovery of a common core of shared understanding cannot logically
lead to views of our underlying political architecture that are, to use
Kay's language, "totally contradictory. ' 63 Such a result itself. contradicts the assumptions of the originalist project.
While the originalist approach understates the difficulty of historical
research, the contextualist or hermeneutic approach overstates the case
against, and undervalues the need for, such research. It overstates the
case by assuming that all issues for which historical research is done are
equally immune to historical determinacy. There are easy cases. 64 It
may be that they do not remain forever easy, that the extant consensus is
necessarily ephemeral. Nonetheless, we simply could not function if all
rules were always at issue; and somehow we do manage to muddle
through. At the same time, contextualists conclude unnecessarily that
because of the admitted difficulty of recovering intent on issues that matter, all intent is unavailable. Kay is correct when he observes that judges
and lawyers are not required to uncover intent in a vacuum. 65 Determining intent does not require proof beyond all doubt. This alone legitimizes
most of the Court's uses of history without calling into question the
Court's own legitimacy. As we move closer to the center and away from
66
the margin of understanding, intent may be recoverable.
There is a persuasive analogous argument that we need not recover
intent with absolute precision to function and make decisions within the
profession. Thomas Kuhn suggests that in the physical sciences practitioners can identify a paradigm that controls their work without necessarily concurring on what it is within the controlling complex that they
all agree to.67 They can test their research by comparing their generative
hypotheses with their empirical data. Complexity propagates research, it
63. Kay, supra note 38, at 248.
64. See Hegland, Goodbye to Deconstruction, 58 S. CAL. L. REv. 1203 (1985); Schauer,
Easy Cases, 58 S.CAL. L. REv. 399 (1985).
65. Kay, supra note 38, at 244 ("[a]ll [the judge] needs to do is decide which of two
possible answers in that case are more likely correct").
66. Although it is probably the case that that intent which is most easily recovered is also
the least useful and important.
67.

T. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIc REVOLUTIONS 44 (2d ed. 1970).
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does not stifle it.68 In a corollary to that observation, William Nelson
argues that contextualists ignore their own premises about the complexity of historical understanding; there may exist, he suggests, more than
one way to discover historical truth with respect to some issues. 69 If that
is true, it suggests that the contextualists have overstated the case against
determinacy. There is something unambiguous, after all, about the tremendous percentage of lawsuits that settle and the absence of a popular
revolt inspired by judicial tyranny. That absence of ambiguity might be
prima facie evidence that all is not lost to history.
A fundamental problem with the approach of the contextualists
deals far less with the logic of their insights into the jurisprudence of
history70 than their underappreciation of the necessity, indeed the inevitability of such a jurisprudence. It is almost as if the very logic of their
position obscures the fact that, despite its apparent illogic, the use of
history to decide these cases continues. For the most part, the bench
ignores contextualists. 71 Thus we must ask several questions: Why has
the bench ignored the hermeneutic insights? Why does the bench persist
in its use of history? Should it?
B.

Limitations of Fairness and Prediction

We could salvage history from the logic of the hermeneutic critique
if we found a value for historical research in law beyond instrumentalism. If we made more modest demands on historical methodology, it
might still serve some useful purpose. Two reasons frequently advanced
for the use of history are related to our concepts of fairness and prediction. Neither will sustain the historical project.
Fairness and history interface in the standard case method routinely
taught in law schools and used daily in legal briefs. The common law
method requires us to use precedent, an inherently historical method, to
treat similarly situated parties similarly. Discussing this method of adjudication, Professor Levi states the issue succinctly: "The problem for the
68. Id. at 95-96.
69. Nelson, supra note 7, at 1245-46 & n.24, 1257-59.
70. M. TUSHNET, supra note 44, at 21-69, Tushnet surveys original intentions and neutral principles theories and critiques each with insight and cool logic. This latest work expands
on his earlier essay. See Tushnet, supra note 10.
71. When members of the bench do respond directly to the insights of the CLS movement, as Judge Rubin did a couple years ago, they tend to talk past one another. Compare
Rubin, Does Law Matter? A Judge's Response to the Critical Legal Studies Movement, 37 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 307 (1987) (attacking the radical position that legal doctrine is meaningless)
with Kennedy, supra note 9, at 532-33 (hypothesizing a typical labor dispute and suggesting
that the judge has far more discretion than Judge Rubin would allow).
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law is: When will it be just to treat different cases as though they were
the same?" 72 Although Levi points out some of the differences between
common law and constitutional adjudication, the method he describes
73
and the reasoning it embodies are in pertinent part indistinguishable.
Indeed, how could they not be? The idea of neutrality, of treating similarly parties who are situated similarly with respect to the law, is a constitutional guaranty.
One justification for using historical methodology, then, is implicit
in the notion of neutrality. 74 There is, however, a nearly insurmountable
problem with this use of history. As others have demonstrated, no matter what principle the Court applies, the antecedent choice of the correct
principle is not neutral. 75 Even if the Court could apply the principle
neutrally, the choice of rule to decide the case must favor one party or
another to the lawsuit.
Professor Nelson and others concede this point, but legitimate the
Court's choice through some species of party consent. 76 Nelson defends
neutrality on the basis of a Rousseauvian concept of the general will. So
72.

E. LEvi, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING 3 (1949).

73. This is not to say that they necessarily should be, only that they are. See generally
Dickerson, Statutes and Constitutionsin an Age of Common Law, 48 U. Prrr. L. REv. 773,
779 (1987) (arguing that Court's methods for interpreting statutes and the Constitution should
be distinct because the Court can supplement Constitutional meaning, but can only extract
statutory meaning).
74. Nelson, supra note 7, at 1260-61, 1265.
75. Tushnet supra note 10, at 805-06.
Levi came close to making this point himself forty years ago.
Where case law is considered,... [the judge] is not bound by the statement of the
rule of law made by the prior judge even in the controlling case. The statement is
mere dictum, and this means that the judge in the present case may find irrelevant
the existence or absence of facts which the prior judges thought important.... [HI]e
will ignore what the past thought important; he will emphasize facts which prior
judges would have thought made no difference.
E. LEvi, supra note 72, at 2-3 (citation omitted).
Professor Tribe reaches.the same conclusion. He writes that even if we could agree on
"constitutional postulates," that is, on normative criteria for construing and enforcing the constitution, "we would remain inescapably subjective in the application of those postulates to
particular problems and issues." L. TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL CHOIcES 5 (1985).
Moreover, there is good reason to question whether "neutral principles" in fact operate
neutrally. For example, in the context of prohibitions on discrimination, neutrality may serve
merely to solidify further the existing hierarchy. See, e.g., L. THUROW, THE ZERO SUM SOCIEFTy 188-89 (1980) (arguing that a movement to a "color blind" society in which employment
and its rewards are distributed entirely on the basis of merit would inevitably operate to the
detriment of minorities). A colleague and I have developed this theme in a recently completed
work, Blumoff and Lewis, The Reagan Court and Title VIL" A Common Law Outlook on a
Statutory Task (copy on file at the Hastings Law Journal). See generally Sunstein, Lochner's
Legacy, 87 COLUM. L. REv. 873 (1987).
76. See, eg., Bork, Neutral Piinciplesand Some FirstAmendment Problems,47 IND. L.J.
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long as the parties agree to be bound by the rules the court applies, the
principles are neutral. Only if the parties did not agree could we question
the Court's authority.
There is a certain irony in this idea. There are parties who truly
consent to be bound by particular rules: arms-length contractual partners who agree in writing to choice of law provisions. They have expressly agreed to be bound by the laws of a chosen jurisdiction.
Ironically, those parties are least in need of neutrality. Eighty percent of
all contract litigation is governed by the Uniform Commercial Code,
which exists in virtually identical form in forty-nine states. 7 7 Thus, those
who have the protection of assent ordinarily need it the least.
For the rest of us, although the idea of a legitimizing consent appears almost self-evident, finding consent is problematic. Actual consent
to the ruling order, including the judicial power of the United States, has
not occurred since the Constitution was ratified. Reliance on some form
of tacit consent is equally troubling. 78 One could argue that every time
we exercise the franchise to vote, we are consenting implicitly to be
bound by society's rules. Such a position is flawed inherently and raises
more questions than it answers. Does that mean that those who do not
vote are not bound, or, conversely, forfeit their right to object on some
sort of estoppel theory? Alternatively, are the Thoreaus of the world to
be treated by a different set of standards since their unwillingness to vote
reflects principled nonconformity? Consent offers an alluring, even seductive way out of the dilemma of non-neutrality, but it is also
79
paradoxical.
A second potential salvation for the historical method lies in the
notion that courts can locate trends in society and law and "extract
[principles] from the past both to decide the pending case and to provide
1, 3-4 (1971); Fiss, The Supreme Court, 1978 Term-Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93
HARV. L. REV. 1 (1979); Nelson, supra note 7, at 1263-65.
77.

D. WHALEY & R. RIVERA, PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS ON SALES 1 (1983).

78. Chemerinsky, The Price of Asking the Wrong Question: An Essay on Constitutional
Scholarship and JudicialReview, 62 TEX. L. REV. 1207, 1228-31 (1984) (discussing and criticizing various theories of consent as justifications for judicial review).
79. Amar, PhiladelphiaRevisited: Amending the Constitution Outside Article V 55 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1043, 1074 (1988). Amar borrows from Rousseau for the idea that because every
society inherits status quo default rules, "some form of implied consent argument is inescapable." Although he may be correct, perhaps all that conclusion warrants is a shift in the
burden of proof toward the party seeking to show a lack of consent. Carter, Constitutional
Adjudication and the Indeterminate Text: A PreliminaryDefense of an Imperfect Muddle, 94
YALE L.J. 821, 838 n.67 (1985). A status quo default rule does not address the more difficult
questions of the effect of failure to consent, of how we judge the effectiveness of the rule and,
most importantly, of how to challenge the rule itself short of bloodshed.
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direction for the future." ° The notion satisfies our desire for predictive
certainty. Unfortunately, on issues that matter the Court's performance
cannot equal the task.
Everything said in response to the idea of neutrality applies with
equal vigor here. If the choice of historical precedent is non-neutral, it
will continue to be in the future. The creation of a new neutral principle
does not guaranty neutral selection of that principle for application in the
future.
There are at least two further difficulties with the concept of the
Court as a predictive organ. First, as Karl Popper pointed out, predicting future ideas is self-contradictory. 81 Consider the following example.
"I predict the Court will create an entirely new penumbral right emanating from the ninth amendment, to wit: .... ." The ellipsis suggests two
possibilities, filling in the blank or leaving it open. If the idea on which
the prediction is based exists today, I can fill in the blank and there is no
prediction. On the other hand, I can leave the sentence incomplete in
which case I have made no meaningful prediction. Thus, predicting
ideas is a logical paradox; and we cannot rely on the Court's holdings as
the basis of predictive certainty.
Second, even if we could create some temporary respite from the
vicissitudes of legal uncertainty, even the best method of recapturing historical trends-some form of contextualism-presents inherent difficulties. Contextualism requires the historian to frame her search in the
context of the then contemporary society. This approach eschews the
notion of an autonomous text, and demands that the meaning of text be
found within the larger milieu of its creation. As Quentin Skinner points
out, without a knowledge of context we "could never grasp from a [text
bound] history what status the given idea may have had at various
times." Without a knowledge of that status, we cannot know its
82
importance.
The difficulty presented by contextualism is distinguishing cause and
effect: Did the idea within the text shape the context, or did the context
shape the idea? Which controls? The point is that knowledge of what
caused an action, including the action of generating a new text, gets confused with understanding the expression itself. As a result, the re80. Nelson, supra note 7, at 1286.
81. Popper's ideas, which were directly concerned with the notion of prediction based on
history, are the subject of an essay by P. MEDAWAR, Expectation and Prediction, in PLUTO'S
REPUBLIC 309 (1982). The ideas expressed in this paragraph derive from those works.
82. Skinner, supra note 6, at 38.
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searcher frequently ends up begging the question. What the text means
8 3
and how the text received its shape become indistinguishable.
Skinner's observations seem particularly germane to the lawyer's use
of history. In Bowsher v. Synar, before concluding that the founders intended to create "separate and wholly independent" political branches of
government, the Court quoted from The FederalistNo. 47. There James
Madison paraphrased Montesquieu and wrote that "there can be no liberty where the legislative and executive powers are united in the same
person ....
This quote purported to provide support for the "separateness" conclusion.
This use of history compels at least two responses. First, the Court's
use of Madison is unacceptably selective; but for the fact that it is the
Court, it would be laughable. The Court wholly disregarded not just
contrary authority, but the rest of The FederalistNo. 47. Madison's entire point was contrary to that for which the Court used the document,
Madison argued that so long as "the whole power" of one branch was not
exercised by another, tyranny was avoided.8 5 As Madison conceived the
issue, jurisdiction sharing between the political branches-not hermetic
separation-created the essential impediment to tyrannical leadership.
Even if we concede a desire on the framers' part to design jurisdictional independence, Bowsher's methodology would remain flawed in a
second way. The Court equated Madison, the context, with the Constitution, which had nothing to say about the issue of nonimpeachable removal authority. Thus, the Court not only confused cause and effect, it
constitutionalized the "cause" (one selection from Madison's Federalist
No. 47) in the absence of any immediate "effect" (constitutional text).
To the extent that the Court ignores contradictory evidence and
confuses cause and effect it violates the basic tenets of both the originalist
and the contextualist. It smothers an originalist premise by ignoring evidence that bears on the understanding of the moment. 86 It breaches a
contextualist premise by failing to recognize that the best The Federalist
"14

83. Id. at 42-44.
84. Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 722 (1986) (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at
325 (J. Madison) (J. Cooke ed. 1961)).
85. THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 302-03 (J. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961); D. EPSTEIN,
THE POLITICAL THEORY OF THE FEDERALIST 130-31 (1984).
86. Although it is somewhat misleading to label R.G. Collingwood an "originalist," see
R.G. COLLINGWOOD, The Nature and Aims of a Philosophy of History, in ESSAYS IN THE
PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY 34, 53 (W. Debbins ed. 1965) ("The infinite whole fact which it is
the historian's business to determine is... a world whose centre is the historian's "immediate"
perception, and whose radius is measured by the depth to which he can see into the significance of that perception.")
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No. 47 could provide was alternatives. Moreover, it calls into question
confidence in the Court as a purveyor of predictive certainty; in the most
troubling way it bears upon the Court's legitimacy.
C. Rhetorical Hyperbole
One final and more traditional, if dismissive, approach to the particular problem raised by Bowsher's implicit rejection8 7 of Nixon's reading
of history is suggested by Karl Llewellyn. In his classic work, The Bramble Bush, Llewellyn, lecturing to a group of freshmen law students, described the verbal maneuvers of advocates and judges. In the lecture, he
excuses excess verbosity as an inherent risk of the profession. We all
make statements in the heat of an argument that we do "not mean ....
except in reference to ... [our] point."' 88 Llewellyn's description is apt
insofar as we all tend to overstate our case as a rhetorical device calculated to convince. We could describe Bowsher as simply another example
of historical ambiguity that generates different readings of history that, in
turn, create different results in different cases. That conclusion is too
simplistic. It does not purport to explain why we use historical materials; neither does it explain how we rationalize inconsistent conclusions
drawn from the same historical materials. The response to those observations demands something beyond a characterization of the lawyers'
tendency to excess verbiage.
In sum, traditional theory has shortcomings that beg for additional
explanations for the use of history. Originalism invariably promises
more than it can deliver. On the one hand, it erects procedural devices to
overcome problems of clarity and, on the other, its usefulness is limited
precisely to those cases that engender the least controversy. Moreover,
at its best it cannot account for absolutely contradictory readings of the
same historical phenomena. At the same time, however, contextualists
tend to confuse cause and effect and tend to require moral certainty when
87. That the majority rejected the Nixon rendition is a conclusion based on something
beyond mere inference from a failure to consider it. Justice White, dissenting, argued for a
flexible, Nixon inspired approach. Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 762 (White, J., dissenting) (citing and
quoting liberally from Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425 (1977)).
88. Llewellyn writes:
[W]ith your mind upon your object you use words, you bring in illustrations, you
deploy and advance and concentrate again. When you have done, you have said
much you did not mean. You did not mean, that is except in reference to your point.
You have brought generalization after generalization up, and discharged it at your
goal; all, in the heat of argument were over-stated. None would you stand to, if your
opponent should urge them to anotherissue. So with the judge. Nay, more so with
the judge. He is not merely human, as you are. He is, as well, a lawyer ....
K. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH 45 (1930).
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"pretty sure" will do. They also fail even to address the fact that for all
its limitations, historicism remains a dominant feature of judicial decisionmaking. Even those who recognize that history cannot operate instrumentally and, therefore, make more modest demands of it, frequently
overlook constraints on its predictive and normative value. Still, the
game goes on.
III.

Cognitive Dissonance

Part of the explanation for the existence of contradictory historical
conclusions may lay in the theory of cognitive dissonance, which is most
closely associated with the work of Leon Festinger. 89 This section discusses this theory and the strategies that we use to reduce that dissonance. The Bowsher case is then analyzed as an example of dissonance
reduction in judicial opinions.
A.

Cognitive Dissonance Theory

The basic proposition of cognitive dissonance theory is that after
making a decision, one experiences tension, a cognitive effect predicated
in part on the degree to which the decision just reached fails to conform
to the intelligent, available information that contradicts that decision. 90
89. Festinger's major works include CONFLICT, DECISION, AND DISSONANCE (1964)
[hereinafter CONFLICT] and A THEORY OF COGNITIVE DISSONANCE (1957) [hereinafter COGNITIVE DISSONANCE]. Festinger's work is concisely summarized in M. DEUTSCH & R.
KRAUSS, THEORIES IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 62-76 (1965). I must acknowledge specially the
assistance of Frank Dane, an Assistant Professor in the Psychology Department at Mercer
University. He listened to and answered all of my questions. I could not have written this
Essay without his patient tutoring.
I hope I am not understood as suggesting that the theory of cognitive dissonance is the
only theory that accounts for some of the phenomenon in the judicial opinions that I discuss. I
have no warrant for such a broad-based assertion; indeed, even those who most strongly support the theory recognize the existence of alternative explanations. J. BREHM & A. COHEN,
EXPLORATIONS IN COGNITIVE DISSONANCE (1962) (especially chapter seven). This is, however, a true essay; recognizing the limitations in theory, I nonetheless suggest that it helps to
explain, even if it cannot exclusively explain, an apparent anomaly in our jurisprudence.
90. Brehm and Cohen, explain that a "dissonant" relationship
exists between two cognitive elements when a person possesses one which follows
from the obverse of another that he possesses. Thus, if A implies B, then holding A
and the obverse of B is dissonant. A person experiences dissonance, that is, a motivational tension, when he has cognitions among which there are one or more dissonant
relationships.
J. BREHM & A. COHEN, supra note 89, at 4. They also make clear that "cognitive elements"
include any "items of information" about which one cognizes, such as "feelings, behavior, and
opinions." Id. at 3.
At the simplest level, a dissonant condition exits when the smoker exclaims: "I know
smoking is dangerous, but I still smoke." The expectation born of the phrase that precedes the
contrastive conjunction is inconsistent with the phrase that follows it. See R. BROWN, SOCIAL
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Affected by such tension or "dissonance," the decisionmaker seeks ways
to reduce it.
Within that general description are several implicit assumptions that
I must introduce. One is the premise that the theory applies to individual and not group decisionmaking. To the social psychologist, all decisionmaking is done by individuals. Although there is a group dynamic
that can operate in collective decisionmaking contexts, that dynamic ultimately operates at the level of individuals and not the group. 91 A second
assumption that underlies this discussion is that the "decisions" of the
Court are the result of decisions made by the individual justices. For the
sake of simplifying the immediate discussion, I will assume a hypothetical case with one majority and one dissenting opinion. In addition, I will
92
assume that there are only two conflicting precedents.
Making decisions yields dissonance. In the Court's procedure dissonance could occur at any number of junctures: on review of certiorari
petitions or certiorari memos, at certiorari conferences, during brief reading or oral argument, during deliberations, and so on. Each justice can
make up his or her mind at any stage in the process. To simplify and
highlight the phenomenon, I will assume that dissonance occurs after
deliberations, but before the opinion writing (and opinion joining) process is completed. 93 This view of the process suggests that actual opinion
PSYCHOLOGY 595-96 (1965). The same phenomenon occurs in routine judicial decision making. The judge says to herself: "I know there is contradictory precedent, but .... "
91. A fascinating example of this process is richly described in R. BROWN, SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY: THE SECOND EDrrION 20045 (1986) (discussing the process of group polarization
and individual risk-taking behavior in the context of the film Twelve Angry Men).
92. That more than one conflicting precedent usually bears upon the resolution of any
particular issue simply magnifies the potential for dissonance. M. DEUTSCH & R. KRAUSS,
supra note 89, at 68-69.
93. Festinger's theory, which has generated an enormous amount of research, deals almost exclusively with post-decision dissonance. As such, the theory deals with issues of bias
and objectivity in an individual's assessment of decisions already reached. M. DEUTSCH & R.
KRAUSS, supra note 89, at 73-74. The theory does not postulate that motivational discomfort
cannot arise before a decision is made. Pre-decisional dissonance does occur.
Festinger distinguished post- and pre-decisional dissonance by suggesting that before a
decision is made, the individual is more objective in her evaluation of the conflicting information. Once the decision is made, however, and a commitment to its consequences exists, the
conflict increases and the decision maker is less objective in her assessment of dissonant cognitions. L. FESTINGER, CONFLICT, supra note 89, at 8-9; M. DEUTSCH & R. KRAUSS, supra
note 89, at 70-71.
Dissonance theory is distinguished from normal "judgmental processes," which is the
rational process of sorting through disparate information (or opinions) and giving each bit the
weight it is deemed to be worth. That process, which frequently results in some sort of compromise, occurs routinely and does not necessarily arouse a tension that requires reduction. J.
BREHM & A. COHEN, supra note 89, at 105-06. Rather, the process described here occurs
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writing (or editing and subscribing thereto) reflects an effect of dissonance reduction.
In his 1957 work, Festinger summarized the theory in three parts as
follows:
1. There may exist dissonant or "nonfitting" relations among cognitive
elements.
2. The existence of dissonance gives rise to pressures to reduce the dissonance and to avoid increases in dissonance.
3. Manifestations of the operation of these pressures include behavior
changes, changes in cognition,
and circumspect exposure to new infor94
mation and new opinions.
Dissonance occurs when the cognitive elements (available information) that have an effect on the resolution of a decision are perceived as
"nonfitting" or inconsistent. When there are facts or opinions or judg9
ments that contradict the decision just made, dissonance often occurs. 5
The plea-"I know X suggests Y, but despite the existence of X, I'm still
doing non-Y"--creates and reflects this tension. In the court context,
the dissonant cognitive elements include the contradictory facts, precedents, or policies that impinge upon ordinary judicial decisionmaking.
When decisionmakers are in a "forced compliance" situation-that is,
when they must make a decision-the magnitude of dissonance that attends one's exposure to inconsistent information is directly proportional
to the importance of the issue to be resolved. 96 The more important the
after the decision maker becomes committed to a position, after ordinary information processing has occurred and compromise or accommodation is no longer possible. Id. at 106.
94. L. FESTINGER, COGNITIVE DISSONANCE, supra note 89, at 31.
95. Issues related to the amount of dissonance that accompanies a situation when the
decisionmaker faces multiple alternatives exceed the scope of this Essay. Suffice it to say that
the amount of dissonance is proportional to the positive and negative attributes of both the
alternative chosen and those which were rejected. When the chosen alternative contains a high
number of positive attributes and the rejected alternatives contain many negative features dissonance is low or nonexistent. By the same token, when the decision has a number of adverse
traits and the information rejected a number of positive traits, dissonance is high. See J.
BREHM & A. COHEN, supra note 89, at 24-42.
96. Id. at 50 ("Given the fact that a person holds a certain opinion .... the greater the
number and/or importance of his cognitions inconsistent with that opinion, the greater will be
the magnitude of dissonance that he experiences."). See Frey, Recent Research on Selective
Exposure to Information, 19 ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 41, 44 (1986)

("The intensity of dissonance depends on the relative proportion of dissonant and consonant
cognitions in the person's cognitive system as well as in the cognition's relative importance.").
In some senses, the Court context does not fit the normal research categories for determining when a decision is "free" or "forced," and may more nearly replicate the situation
when one is simply exposed to discrepant information. In most "free-choice" research, for
example, the decisionmaker faces attractive alternatives and chooses between two or more.
Conversely, the "forced compliance" scenario generally contemplates a number of unattractive
alternatives. J. BREHM & A. COHEN, supra note 89, at 21. Given the use to which I put the
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issue the greater is the dissonance aroused by the contradictory
information.
The need to reduce the tension that dissonance imposes upon the
individual stems from the entirely human desire to maintain a self-image
that is consistent with the environment. Not many of us truly enjoy being out of touch with conventional behavior. 97 Dissonance theory proposes no more than this: When we are in a state of discomfort or tension
created by the existence of information inconsistent with that to which
we are committed, that is, information that is inconsistent with the environment, we are motivated to "achieve consonance." 9 8 It is fair to indulge in the supposition that justices see themselves as performing a duty
that requires them to act as careful, conscientious interpreters of the
Constitution. 99 In addition, each no doubt wants and needs to preserve
that image and perhaps even enhance it within the process of judging.
These modest imputations are both necessary and sufficient to explain
the need to reduce dissonance in the judicial context.c0
Designs for reducing dissonance require the actor to confront the
inconsistent information or opinion. Dissonance theorists speak of altering stored memory as a way to reduce dissonance.10 1 Memory may be
stored in written form as well as in nerve cells and synapses; inconsistent
facts and opinions can reach us in variety of ways.10 2 Thus, the judge
who explains that although she is aware of inconsistent precedent she
nonetheless decides as she does is acknowledging the effect of stored information on her decisionmaking'process. The notion of "altering memory" has about it the air of dissembling, but dissimulation is not an issue.
theory, the lack of a precise fit is not crucial; the generalization in the text spans the typical
research contexts. Id. at 4.
97. R. BRowN, supra note 90, at 549 ("The human mind, it seems, has a strong need for
cbnsistency and attitudes are generally changed in order to eliminate some inconsistency."). It
is worth repeating that this dissonance exists because after a decision is reached, the individual
must still confront information that suggests she is wrong. Thus the motivation exists to justify that to which the individual has committed. M. DEUTSCH & R. KRAuss, supra note 89, at
70.
98. R. BROWN, supra note 90, at 584.
99. Perhaps the most radical attempt to achieve the status of "conscientious interpreter"
is Justice Roberts', claim that he was not interpreting at all, but simply "lay[ing] the article of
the Constitution which is invoked beside the statute which is challenged and ... decid[ing]
whether the latter squares with the former." United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 62 (1936).
100. Deutsch, Krauss & Rosenau, Dissonance or Defensiveness?, 30 J. PERSONALrrY 16,
18 (1962) (arguing that dissonance need not follow all decisions, but that it does occur "when
[the decisionmaker] perceives his choice in a given situation to be inconsistent with the conception of some aspect of himself which he tries to maintain (for himself or for others) in that
situation").
101. See L. FEsTINGER, CONFLICT, supra note 89, at 133-45..
102. Frey, supra note 96, at 44.
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This process of altering memory is nonduplicitous: it occurs not through
deliberate efforts to conceal or prevaricate, but because it must. 0 3 The
existence of inconsistent information, coupled with our commitment and
need to defend the decision we have just made, operate at a psychological
depth that is beyond our ordinary control. 04
When dissonant information arrives, we generally employ one or
more of three strategies for altering memory, thereby reducing dissonance. Of the three strategies for reducing dissonance, perhaps the simplest conceptually is the theory of "selective exposure." 105 This strategy
hypothesizes that the decisionmaker simply will ignore discrepant information, selectively exposing herself only to information favoring the decision already made. For example, even though a justice may have heard
conflicting arguments during oral argument, once the decision is made,
but before opinion writing, she will omit reexamination of the conflicting
precedent. As one quickly might conclude, this phenomenon is least
likely to occur when the Court splits; the dissent serves as a reminder
that conflicting precedent exists. All the same, we are familiar with majority opinions that fail to acknowledge even the existence of a dissenting
10 6
point of view!
The second strategy is known as "bolstering."'107 This theory
predicts that after the decision is made, the individual will consider the
103.

In his later work, Festinger came to question whether dissonance was always aroused

post-decisionally. L. FESTINGER, CONFLICT, supra note 89, at 156; M. DEUTSCH & R.
KRAUSS, supra note 89, at 73. To the extent that the importance of the issue increases the
likelihood of dissonance, see supra note 95, and to the extent that a decision maker knows that
her decision will affect subsequent behavior, dissonance is aroused. J. BREHM & A. COHEN,
supra note 89, at 300.
104. Psychoanalysts have labelled an analogous phenomenon "rationalization" and argued
that this is a useful description because dissonance reduction is ultimately a species of defensive techniques. M. DEUTSCH & R. KRAUSS, supra note 89, at 74. If the use of that term
helps isolate the phenomenon under discussion, the reader is invited to use it. The problem is
that the idea of "rationalization," in modem, nontechnical parlance, seems to carry precisely
the wrong connotation. It suggests the very process of dissimulation that the dissonance theorists would reject.

105. See generally Frey, supra note 96 (summarizing research on the theory of selective
exposure).
106. For a recent example in which the majority and dissent seemed to be addressing two
different problems, see Martin v. Wilks, 109 S.Ct. 2180 (1989) (majority addressing narrow
question of interface between FED. R. CIV. PRO. 19 and 24; dissent addressing larger issue of
collateral attacks on consent judgments implementing affirmative action plans). See also
DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dept. Soc. Serv., 109 S.Ct. 998 (1989) (majority literally
failing to acknowledge dissent).

107. I again acknowledge my debt to Professor Dane for making me aware of this phenomenon. A useful explanation of the phenomenon is the following:
Adding new cognitions reduces dissonance if (a) the new cognitions add weight to
one side and thus decrease the proportion of cognitive elements that are dissonant, or
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discordant details, but will add consistent facts to those on which she
based her decision in an effort to "bolster" support for the decision already made. As applied to the judicial scenario, bolstering occurs when
the justices send their clerks out to hunt up additional precedent to support that which already favors the decision. Under these circumstances,
the written opinion will usually take formal cognizance of the opposing
precedent, but undermine its value-and reduce dissonance-by overwhelming the inharmonious, opposing precedent with generous helpings
of compatible precedent. The Court's use of string citations in a majority
opinion may be a reflection of bolstering. It is as if the Court was saying:
"Yes, you've found some cases for your side, but look at all the cases we
found for ours!"
The final strategy, and the one which has generated the most research, is the attitude (or evaluative) change hypothesis.10 8 Attitude
change in a social setting occurs in a number of ways. One is to reinterpret the dissonance-generating facts or precedents to depreciate their
value or importance in the decisionmaking process. This practice is
probably more familiar to us than we realize. Many of us are aware of
the smoker who, asked how he can continue to smoke in the face of "all
that evidence," responds: "They haven't proven it to me. Why I was just
reading ... ." He has undervalued the strength of the nonconforming
information. Lawyers are aware of the reinterpreted precedent, a common feature in opinion writing. It also reflects, at least in part, an attempt at dissonance reduction. 109
(b) the new cognitions change the importance of the cognitive elements that are in
dissonant relation with one another.
H. MARKUS & R. ZAJONC, The Cognitive Perspective in Social Psychology, in I THE HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 137, 202 (3d ed. 1985). See generally M. DEUTSCH & R.
KRAUSS, supra note 89, at 70-71 ("Rats and people come to love the things for which they
have suffered." Presumably they do so in order to reduce the dissonance induced by the suffering and their method of dissonance reduction is to enhance the attractiveness of the choice
which led to their suffering.).
108. See Frey, supra note 96, at 45 (arguing that "dissonance reduction via selective exposure necessitates a considerable buildup of relevant cognitions by drawing selectively on the
environment, whereas evaluative change necessitates nothing but change in one's cognitions").
109. The precise example is drawn from Frey, supra note 96, at 48-49 (summarizing the
research of Feather, Cognitive Dissonance, Sensitivity, and Evaluation, 66 J. ABNORMAL &
SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 157 (1963)).
There is no effort here to explain all of the Court's opinions in terms of dissonance reduction. Some decisions may arouse no dissonance. See supra notes 95, 100. String citations
reflect the justices' belief that settled law decides the problem, despite the dissent's contrary
authority. The point is that the "belief" is both genuine and a necessary component of the
reduction process.
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A variant of the dissonance-reduction-by-reinterpretation strategy
for changing attitudes involves not merely undervaluing the inconsistent
fact, but making it irrelevant. Again, the smoking scenario provides a
convenient illustration. Now the smoker who is asked the increasingly
embarrassing question not only diminishes the probativeness of studies
explicating the health risks of smoking, but argues that they are irrelevant. "Research on rats does not tell us anything," he will respond. The
same phenomenon occurs routinely in Supreme Court opinions. Justices
constantly reinterpret precedent to dismiss the inconsistent old case from
the decisionmaking process. We are told that Case A, as reinterpreted,
simply has no place in the current decision; it dealt with an entirely different scenario. 10
B.

Dissonance in Bowsher

To test fully the hypothesis that dissonance reduction exists in
Court opinions, one would need to conduct an empirical study that
measures a number of variables, including the importance of the issue,
strength of the dissent both in terms of precedent and persuasiveness of
argument, individual justice's commitment to the issues sub judice, and
the like, across a statistically significant number of decisions."' In the
absence of such a study, I nonetheless provide persuasive evidence that
such a dynamic is present in the Bowsher opinion.
Bowsher generated four opinions, a majority subscribed to by five
justices, a concurring opinion in which two members joined, and separate
dissents from Justices White and Blackmun. I propose to set out most of
the substantial contradictory arguments and precedents relied upon by
the concurring and dissenting opinions, and then examine the majority's
responses thereto. If dissonance exists, evidence should appear in the
nature of those responses.
The majority, prefacing its analysis on the notion that the founders
created a government of "separate and wholly independent" political
branches, concluded that the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit
Reduction Act of 1985 ("Gramm-Rudman") violated separation of powers. The Act's transgression was to confide "Executive" functions to the
Comptroller General, an agent under the control of Congress. The forbidden control existed because Congress had arrogated the authority to
110.

Examples of this kind of reasoning in Supreme Court decisions are too broad to re-

count. See infra text accompanying notes 140-42.
111. Such a study is beyond the scope of this suggestive essay. The Frey article, supra note
96, at 50-70, summarizes the research on the most important variables between 1964 and 1986
in the area of selective exposure.
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remove the Comptroller General for cause by joint resolution.11 2 Bowsher's holding was premised on an inflexible, formalistic view of governing theory.
Justice Stevens, by contrast, purported to break free from analysis
by formal deduction in his concurring opinion.1 1 3 Although he agreed
with the majority's result, he found that the statute violated separation of
powers in a distinct manner. In Stevens' opinion, Gramm-Rudman did
not require that the Comptroller General "execute" the law at all; rather,
he acted in a legislative capacity. As such, the Comptroller General's
authority to dictate budget cuts, a task functionally equivalent to making
legislative policy, violated Article I's bicameral and presentment
1 14

requirements.

There were two dissents. In one, Justice White borrowed from
Nixon's flexibility premises and rejected any notion of rigid compartmentalization of governing functions.1 15 Although White agreed with
the majority that the Comptroller General's duties under the statute were
"executive," he challenged the majority in a number of ways. First, he
attacked its approach. Rather than using formal categories to determine
the propriety of Congress' ability to remove one who undertakes executive tasks, he employed a two part analysis that asked if the removal
provisions prevented the Executive from "accomplishing its constitutionally assigned functions," and if so, "whether th[e] impact [on the Executive Branch] is justified by an overriding need to promote objectives
within the constitutional authority."1 1 6 In other words, White began
with the premise that Congress had the necessary and proper authority
112. Under an act passed in 1921, Congress could remove the Comptroller General for
reasons stated in the statute, see infra note 133, which requires a joint resolution, or by impeachment. 31 U.S.C. § 703(e)(1) (1982). The resolution requires passage by both houses and
presentment. Thus, if the President vetoed the resolution, the Comptroller General could only
be removed by two-thirds majority of both houses, a bipartisan effort.
The majority's reasoning was a simple syllogism predicated on the notion that separation
of powers demands that only the executive and subordinates under his control can execute the
law. Under this view, removal is a primary tool of control. Blumoff, supra note 18, at 1173.
113. Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 737 (1986) (Stevens, J., concurring) (opining that his
analysis did not "depend[] on a labeling of ... functions"; but ending his analysis with, in
essence, a different label. Id. at 756).

114. Id.at 756-59.
115. White prefaced his analysis with the following: "While the Constitution diffuses
power the better to secure liberty, it also contemplates that practice will integrate the dispersed
powers into a workable government." Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 760 (White, J., concurring) (quoting Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring)). See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 707 (1974) (framing its privilege analysis
with the same quote).
116. Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 762 (White, J., dissenting) (quoting Nixon v. Administrator of
Gen. Serv., 433 U.S. 425, 443 (1977)).
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to pass Gramm-Rudman, and balanced the invasiveness of the use of that
authority against the Executive's ability to perform his required tasks.
Second, Justice White challenged the majority's interpretation of the
relationship between the Comptroller General's tenure and legislative
will. White pointed out that removal required a bipartisan effort that
demanded a potential veto override, and thus conformed to the demands
of bicameralism and presentment set out in Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha.117 As such, removal of the Comptroller General
was more arduous legislatively than impeachment; the latter requires for
conviction only a two-thirds vote of the Senate, while a veto override
requires two-thirds of both houses.' 1 8 Thus, Justice White found inapt
the majority's conclusion that the Comptroller General was a captive of
legislative will.
Finally, Justice White relied on the unchallengeable fact that Congress, in the sixty-five year history of the statute creating the Comptroller
General's office, had never attempted to remove a Comptroller General.11 9 The Blackmun dissent rested entirely on this point; the majority,
he argued, was striking down the wrong statute. Given the Comptroller
General's sixty-five years of independence from Congress, the Court
should strike down the act granting Congress the authority to remove
him, not the act to reduce the budget deficit. 120
From this illustration of the major differences that separated the
various opinion writers, coupled with an analysis of the majority's treatment of precedent, one sees evidence of all three dissonance reductions
techniques-selective exposure, bolstering, and attitude (or evaluative)
change both by undervaluing discordant information and by reinterpreting it.
Indications of selective exposure follow from the Court's complete
disregard for the applicability of the flexible approach from Nixon to the
separation of powers issue. The majority ignored two dissonant cognitive
elements: Nixon's appraisal of the generative history of separation of
powers, and its analytical framework that balanced congressional intrusiveness against the overriding need for the legislation. This failure to
acknowledge a competing line of precedent is difficult to explain in traditional Llewellyn terms given the justices' uniform agreement that the
117.
(1983)).
118.
119.
120.

Id. at 767 (discussing Immigration and Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919
Id. at 771 (White. J., dissenting).
Id. at 778.
Id. at 783-87 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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need to reduce the deficit was overriding.1 2 1 One might have expected
that the acknowledged importance of the issue would argue in favor of an
explanation for something as basic as the Court's overall approach to the
problem. Instead, the Court ignored it. As dissonance theorists have observed the amount of dissonance aroused is directly proportional to the
importance of the issue. 122 Thus, the Court's failure to respond to discordant information that it had previously produced, its old notecards,
strengthens the conviction that dissonance was aroused and reduced
through the mechanism of selective exposure.
Hints that bolstering was at work were revealed in the Court's historical preamble. As I have suggested throughout, no meaningful history
surrounding the Constitution's founding elucidated the issue before the
Court. The framers were totally silent in the Constitutional Convention
about removal of civil officers of the United States outside the elaborate
process of impeachment. To the extent that substantial historical author-

ity existed, it was Hamilton's ratification induced statement in The FederalistNo. 77 that the Senate could participate in the removal process. 123
Neglecting that precedent and unable to bring determinative historical
material to the question, the Court devoted the better part of three pages
to the unquestioned proposition that there is a recognized "danger of
congressional usurpation of Executive functions." 124 The Court attempted to overwhelm the reader with historical understanding precisely
because it could neither discover directly relevant material nor prove
why Bowsher's statutory scheme threatened aggrandizement by Congress.12 5 Despite its inability to answer that basic question, which was at

121. It is true that in Commodities Futures Trading Comm'n. v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833
(1986), handed down the same day as Bowsher, a slightly different majority of the Court attempted to reconcile the two approaches. It did so by using non-historical doctrinal distinctions. The attempted reconciliation ignored both the legal and factual issues raised by Justice
White about the relationship between the Comptroller General and Congress. Id. at 856-57.
122. See supra note 95.
123. THE FEDERALIST No. 77, at 459 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961). Before Myers
v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926), it was assumed by every court that looked at the issue
that the power to remove was an incident of the power to appoint. Blumoff, supra note 18, at
1109-24.
124. Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 727. The three pages of historical materials appear id. at 72124. This is not to say that the Court's own history was silent on the issue. Bowsher did
address its own historiography within the historical section of the opinion. The full history of
the Court's own forays into this area is the subject of Blumoff, supra note 18.
125. There was nothing wrong with the principle the Court elaborated in Bowsher,
namely, that the Necessary and Proper Clause itself prohibits Congress from exercising executive functions. The problem with Bowsher is two-fold: (1) nothing in the statute suggested that
.congressional usurpation would occur, and (2) the Court's reading of history was erroneous.
Blumoff, supra note 18, at 1145, 1173. For the suggestion that standing was improperly
granted, see id. at 1145 n.435. See generally Blumoff, supra note 42.
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the heart of Justice White's dissent, the Court nevertheless employed historical analysis instrumentally, as a preamble to provide a justificatory
1 26
framework for its ultimate analysis.
That preamble also suggests dissonance reduction by selective exposure and reinterpretation. Consider, for example, the majority's discussion of the "Decision of 1789" and Humphrey's Executor v. United
States.127 The first Congress decided in 1789 that the newly created Secretary of Foreign Affairs could be removed by the President without congressional participation. That decision turned on two considerations:
the nature of the office (both its high rank and its need for confidences
and confidentiality) and the popularity of President Washington.1 2 8 In
Bowsher, the majority omitted any discussion of these once dispositive
considerations, quoting instead from Madison to prove that any connection between the legislature and executive in the removal process would
give the Senate "too much Executive power" over the President, and simultaneously "diminish the responsibility ...

of the Executive."1 29 The

Bowsher Court simply, and apparently disingenuously, concluded that
"Madison's position ultimately prevailed, and a congressional role in the
removal process was rejected."1 30 The unmistakable drift of the majority's discussion, in the context of the removal conditions at issue in the
Comptroller General's office, was that any congressional participation in
126. There is an unintended irony here because as more and more researchers look into
the general question of the framers' intent and the separation of powers doctrine, they discover
that the framers had no intent that the doctrine be used instrumentally to resolve particular
problems. See Blumoff, supra note 18, at 1082 ("The framers ... never intended separation of
powers as a rule of decision: the doctrine was a blunt-edged political organizing principle used
to construct a government."); Casper, An Essay in Separation of Powers: Some Early Version

and Practices,30 WM. & MARY L. REV. 211 (1989) (separation of powers supportive of constitutional theory, but not doctrine partly because there was no clear doctrine. The separation of
powers provision was perceived as "the chain of connection that binds the whole fabric of the
Constitution."); Gwyn, The Indeterminacyof the Separation of Powers in the Age of the Fram-

ers, 30 WM. & MARY L. REV. 263 (1989) (separation of powers doctrine intended to achieve
objectives of accountability of officials and efficiency of government but no consensus among
framers as to which government actions belonged to each type of organization, i.e., assembly of
equal membership or executive hierarchically-organized council).
127. 295 U.S. 602 (1935).
128. J. FLEXNER, WASHINGTON: THE INDISPENSABLE MAN 220-21 (1974) (arguing that

but for Washington's popularity, Congress would not have approved presidential removal authority without Senate participation); Corwin, Tenure of Office and the Removal Power under
the Constitution, 27 COLUM. L. REV. 353, 369 (1927) (still the definitive study of the "Decision
of 1789"). See Rosenberg, PresidentialControl of Agency Rulemaking: An Analysis of ConstitutionalIssues that May Be Raised by Executive Order 12,291, 23 ARZ. L. REV. 1199, 1206-07
(1981) (pointing out that Congress gave the President complete discretion over the Department of Foreign Affairs, Navy, and War, but not the Treasury).
129. Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 723 (quoting 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 380).
130. Id. at 723 (emphasis added).
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the removal of an officer who executed the law was constitutionally
impermissible.
The majority's use of historical precedent also reflected a clear attitude or evaluative change. In Humphrey's Executor, which Bowsher relied on, the Court had noted that "the [foreign affairs] office under
consideration by Congress [in 1789] was not only purely executive [a
nonhistorically based doctrinal distinction], but the officer one who was
responsible to the President, and to him alone, in a very definite
sense." 131 Moreover, the Humphrey's Executor Court noted, when the
first Congress considered the office of Comptroller of the Treasury
shortly thereafter, "Mr. Madison quite evidently thought that.., a different rule in respect of executive removal might well apply." 132 Thus
the Bowsher majority not only overlooked the historical record as revealed in the Annals of Congress (reduced dissonance through selective
exposure), it rewrote and reinterpreted its own record of that record (reduction by evaluative change), in part by disregarding its own understanding (selective exposure redux).
Bowsher contains other examples of selective exposure and evaluative change. Justice Stevens pointed out that the removal conditions at
issue in Humphrey's Executor were nearly identical to those in Bowsher.133 In the earlier case, the Court upheld those conditions because
the "coercive influence [of presidential removal] threaten[ed] the independence" of the Federal Trade Commissioners.13 4 That independence,
the Court had opined in its review of the legislative history, was critical
35
to the commission's functioning.1
The Bowsher majority did refer to Humphrey's Executor's coercion
language, and it chose to quote from the same paragraph in which the
language above appeared, but omitted the language. Bowsher quoted the
following:
The fundamental necessity of maintaining each of the three departments of government entirely free from the control or coercive influence, direct or indirect, of either of the others, has often been
stressed and is hardly open to serious question. So much is implied in
131.

Humphrey's Ex'r, 295 U.S. at 631.

132. Ia1
133. The Comptroller General could be removed for "(i) permanent disability; (ii) inefficiency; (iii) neglect of duty; (iv) malfeasance; or (v)a felony or conduct involving moral turpitude." 31 U.S.C. § 703(e)(1)(B) (1982). The FTc Commissioner could be removed for
"inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office." With respect to the crucial issue of
independence from political control, the statutes are identical. 478 U.S. at 738 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (quoting Federal Trade Commission Act, ch. 113, 38 Stat. 717, 718 (1914)).
134. Humphrey's Ex'r, 295 U.S. at 630.
135. Id. at 625-26.
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the very fact of the separation of the powers of these departments by
the Constitution; and in the rule which recognizes their essential coequality. [Humphrey's Executor,] 295 U.S., at 629-630.136
The Bowsher majority stopped one sentence short of the "coercive influence" on the FTC language in the preceding paragraph, and used its
select Humphrey's Executor language to establish what are nearly opposite conclusions: first, that "Congress cannot reserve for itself the power
of removal... ;,,137 and second, that those nearly identical removal conditions subject the Comptroller General to congressional will. 138 In sum,
while Humphrey's Executor used the language to demonstrate that the
removal conditions served the need for independence from the executive,
Bowsher used them to establish subservience. Bowsher's majority both
selectively exposed itself to controlling precedent and reinterpreted it at
139
the same time.
The majority opinion also reflects several instances of dissonance reduction through reinterpretation to irrelevance. In his dissent, Justice
White indicated that removal by joint resolution would require a vetooverride if the President disapproved of the resolution. That bipartisan
requirement, added to the removal restrictions, led White to conclude
14
that removal might be more difficult to effect than impeachment. 0
Although the Court playfully juxtaposed the removal language with
grounds for impeachment, its bottom line was to dismiss White's argument as irrelevant. "Surely," the Court wrote, "no one would seriously
suggest that judicial independence would be strengthened by allowing
removal of federal judges only by joint resolution finding 'inefficiency,'
'neglect of duty,' or 'malfeasance.' "141
Of course no one made such a suggestion; in fact, neither "strengthening" independence nor the judicial tenure was at issue. The question
was whether the tenure conditions imposed on removal of the Comptroller General created independence from Congress. The Court opined that
it did not, but it never gave a convincing reason for so deciding. Instead,
in this example, it reduced a cogent factual observation to a non sequitur.
Similarly, the Court disregarded almost wholly White's observation that
in its sixty-five year history, Congress had never removed a Comptroller
136.

Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 725.

137.

Id. at 726.

138. Id. at 727-32.
139. Humphrey's Executor also raised an issue not presented in Bowsher, namely the ability of Congress to tether presidential removal authority. In that sense, the cases were
distinguishable.
140. Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 771 (White, J., dissenting).
141. Id. at 730.
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General from office. The closest the Bowsher majority came to responding to that observation was its statement that "[tihe separation of powers
...
cannot be permitted to turn on judicial assessment of whether an
officer exercising executive power is on good terms with Congress." 142
Again, it reduced the discordant information to irrelevance, rather than
face the information head on.
C. Dissonance or What?
Although other examples of dissonance reduction exist, 143 the preceding discussion illustrates the process. Faced with many cognitive elements that failed to conform to the information it processed to reach its
decision, the majority employed various strategies to reduce the accompanying dissonance. All this may leave the reader with the question:
How do I know that what this author characterizes as dissonance reduction is what he claims it is? Some clue that a psychological process is at
work may lie in the unacceptability of alternative explanations.
One alternative explanation for the Court's failure to respond at all
to a number of the issues raised, what social psychologists have called
"selective exposure," is that the points raised were not deemed to be important. That is, the majority neglected to respond because it felt no
need to dignify trivia. That conclusion is difficult to accept with regards
to a number of the omissions. Stopping two sentences short of the punch
line in Humphrey's Executor, failing to quote from that same case with
respect to Madison's opinion on the removability of the Comptroller of
the Treasury, and failing entirely to respond to alternative conceptions of
separation of powers and modes of analysis look more like deliberate ignorance or reckless disregard of precedent than lack of importance. Here
it is crucial to emphasize again that strategies to reduce cognitive dissonance are decidedly nonduplicitous. They simply permit the decisionmaker to adjust to her decision and accommodate nonfitting
cognitive elements.
Another explanation, potentially apt with respect to the Court's use
of history, accepts historical indeterminacy and notes that the Court,
faced with doctrinally distinct issues, frequently uses only that history
that supports a conclusion reached independent of history. This is no
142. fI
143. For example, the Bowsher majority did not respond to Justice Blackmun at all; it
made no mention ofJustice Steven's conclusion that the functions performed by the Comptroller General were "legislative"; and it recharacterized Chadha to analogize Congress's removal
authority to a legislative veto, a rather preposterous conclusion in light of the history of the
office, the mechanics of removal, and the nature of the removal conditions.
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response at all. It not only begs the question raised in this essay, namely,
how the Court deals with its own history and historiography, but generates profoundly disturbing questions as well. If a result is not even potentially a function of history, why use it at all? And if judges and
lawyers must use it in decisionmaking, why use it so selectively? Does
not the process of selection threaten to undermine the very legitimacy
that is assumed to inhere in the judicial use of history? What justifies
disregarding your own history? This response leaves those questions unanswered, or worse, it assumes implicitly that they are not important.
Professor Llewellyn suggests a third alternative to the dissonance
thesis: excess rhetoric to support an idea. 144 That explanation suffers
from at least two deficiencies. It is woefully underanalyzed. It does not
tell us why the excess exists other than that the judge is a lawyer. That
partakes more of phrenology than of meaningful explanation. It assumes
without analysis some special logorrheic disease associated with what it
is to be a "lawyer," and fails to analyze why we change our conceptions
of the law without sufficiently explicating the bases for those changing
conceptions. Nor will Llewellyn's conclusion rationalize reinterpretation
of precedent. We could conclude that we reinterpret precedent whenever
new facts fail to conform with existing case law, but that explanation also
begs the question raised here: why not do it in a manner that appears
more forthright?
We might also interpret what I have described as evidence of dissonance as personal prejudice and dispatch the questions raised here
through ad hominem attacks. We could argue, for example, that the justices took contradictory positions in different cases because they were illinformed, or that they decided the issues on entirely personal bases and
then sloppily applied precedent to support that conclusion, or that they
simply favored one disputant over another, or that they undertook
shoddy research. None of those alternatives is particularly appealing;
none is necessary in any particular case to understand the apparently
haphazard use of both the nation's and the Court's own history.
In short, there are at least three alternative conclusions we could
reach about the Bowsher majority's treatment of dissonant elements in
the context of its separation of powers jurisprudence. We could conclude
that it deemed certain non-fitting cognitions trivial; that it disdained another result because it impinged on overwhelming personal predilections;
144. See supra note 88. Because Professor Llewellyn was speaking in the immediate context of judicial rhetoric, one could interpret his description as pure cynicism about the disinterestedness of judges. That conclusion, of course, would collapse his argument into nihilism or a
pure will theory.
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and (or) that the majority failed to do sufficient research (or appreciate
what it had done). Arguably all of these explanations envision personal
attacks on the judges' motives. None purports to be comprehensive,
none is even theoretically verifiable, and none is necessary.
Conclusion: The Essential Struggle with History
An understanding of the Court's struggle with history is especially
important in light of the widely shared belief that justices of the United
States Supreme Court serve a public educational function. Alexander
Bickel characterizes the Court's role as, in part, "moral" and "mystic"; it
preserves democratic faith by "legitimating" our constitutional system. 145 Despite the Court's occasional and unavoidable bow to expediency that is driven by principle, through these roles it educates the body
politic. 146 For Professor Burt, the pedagogical function is more immediate: the justices' commitment to giving reasons for its decisions, he
writes, is a methodological feature designed in large measure "to show
the loser how he should reconceive his own position and abandon his...
claim... in light of [shared] communal principles .... "147 Professor
Ackerman goes further still. In his view, judicial review fulfills a "signaling" function that makes it plain to the public that "something special is
happening in the halls of power;.., that the moment has come.., to
determine whether our generation will respond by making the political
48
effort required to redefine, as private citizens, our collective identity."
In the face of such authority, and as a teacher who finds himself
generally unable to leave the role, I have the sense (if only visceral) that
the Court does serve a public informative function. Certainly on the issues that matter-reproductive choice and civil rights, to name two-the
Court's effect is immediate. Public interest groups and the press drive
these decisions home without delay. On other issues, the effect is mediated in ways that go beyond this Essay. In either case, some interpretive
community is mindful of the Court's apparently shabby treatment of
both the Constitution's and its own history. Thus, an explanation for the
Court's apparently careless use of history seems particularly appropriate,
if we accept that some use of history is necessary.
145.

A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 31 (2d ed. 1986).

146. Id at 65-72 (placing the Court within the Lincolnian tension, 4e., the tension between
principles and expediency). For a similar conclusion from a very different perspective, see E.
CHEMERINSKY, INTERPRETING THE CONSTrrUTION 90-91, 136-37 (1987).

147. Burt, The Constitution of the Family, 1979 Sup. CT. REv. 329, 353-54.
148. Ackerman, The StorrLectures: Discoveringthe Constitution, 93 YALE L.J. 1013, 1050
(1984).
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The use of history is indispensable. First, the widespread use of historical foundations for the Court's opinions no doubt reflects the belief
that such a basis provides a necessary transition between the world that
preceded the opinion and the world that follows it. To the extent that
the Court serves as a public classroom it, like all teachers, requires credibility. One attribute of credibility is legitimacy; and one facet of legitimacy lies in the ability of the Court to persuade the American people
that the opinions its writes are not of its own making, but of the imperatives that flow from the text it interprets. Establishing constitutional imperatives requires time, a quality that a precedent-based system of
jurisprudence provides. Even if we suspect that text alone cannot dictate
results, public acceptability-of the Court and its decisions-demands
the broadly based belief that it does. 149 If the Court were tomorrow to
declare that socialism is blended into the fabric of the American Constitution, for example, most citizens would react in horror. The body politic has not been prepared for such a result.' 50
Because the Court's poor use of historical materials threatens the
viability of the very teaching task it performs, something beyond
pedagogy is necessary to explain that seeming misuse. The theory of cognitive dissonance has the virtue of providing a more benign psychological
explanation for uses of history that might otherwise suggest more pernicious motives. The need to attend to the tension that inheres in important decisions is a shared human trait; and sitting in a human-made
pantheon does not alleviate the problem. The approach of cognitive dissonance vitiates the necessity of ad hominem attack and explains inconsistencies without challenging the justices' sagacity or mendacity, and
without wallowing in a nihilistic morass. It does so, in addition, in a
particularly appealing way: it requires us to view the justices as humans
susceptible to the same pressures in decisionmaking as the rest of us. It
also helps to explain a limitation on the instrumental use of history: the
tendency to select those notecards that best support the position we have
already taken.
149. As Judge Linde wrote, "[h]owever useful it is to recognize that the law emerges from
what judges do, it does not serve well as a source of premises for what judges should do."
Linde, Judges, Critics, and the Realist Tradition, 82 YALE L.J 227, 252 (1972).
150. The reasons listed here for the use of history are not exhaustive. See, e.g., Nelson,
supra note 7, at 1260-61 (discussing neutrality and traditions as normative concerns for
judges); Sandalow, supra note 3, at 1062-70 (describing evolutionary interpretation and the
relevance of the historical process); Wiecek, supra note 2, at 232-33 (understanding history's
impact on judges in the broader, anti-instrumental sense of providing perspective); Wofford,
supra note 5, at 528-33 (urging that history be used not as binding, but as past insights that
held shape sensible personal judgments).
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That observation serves as the groundwork for the' last point I intend to make. As Thomas Kuhn and others have pointed out, even in
the so-called "hard sciences" induction always follows from deduction;
we are always guided by what we believe we will find. 15 1 If that is correct, it suggests two corollaries for the use of history. First, it undermines some of the force in the critical observation that the originalist is
predestined to find answers in original sources. Originalist and contextualist alike are motivated by the hypotheses they carry with them to the
task. Second, it suggests that we simply cannot employ history instrumentally; the existence of novelty, of unanticipated fact patterns, necessarily undermines deductive solutions based on history.
Again I draw from Kuhn. Science can discover novelty and anomalous facts in the course of normal research, that is, research directed at
"problems that can be solved with conceptual and instrumental techniques close to those already in existence."' 15 2 In science, unanticipated
novelty results from discordance among the researcher's understanding
of the problem, her tools, the existing paradigm, and the newly emerging
paradigm. Kuhn concludes: "Obviously, then, there must be a conflict
between the paradigm that discloses anomaly and the one that later ren153
ders the anomaly law-like."'
Unlike the hard sciences, wherein anomaly compels the practitioner
to retool periodically and thoroughly, in law we rarely acknowledge
anomalous occurrences. In lieu of permitting a legal revolution, the
Court acts as though the novel fact configuration is just another in a line
of episodes for which the preexisting legal paradigm stands at the ready.
Thus, we almost always rely on the same skills and precedents at hand,
even when the fit is terribly awkward. Rather than adjusting or discarding entire paradigms,1 54 we generally meet conflict-with incremental rein-,
terpretation. In the end, then, the conflict is reduced-the anomaly is
made to appear "law-like"-in texts that suggest that anomaly does not
exist. At an individual level, cognitive dissonance often helps us understand what otherwise appears as pretense.
151. T. KUHN, supra note 67, at 46-47; see P. MEDAWAR, INDUCTION AND INTUITION IN
SCIENTIFIC THOUGHT (1969); P. MEDAWAR, Hypothesis and Imagination,supra note 81, at
115.
152. T. KUHN, supra note 67, at 95.
153. Id. at 96.
154. This is not to say that paradigms do not change. The treatment of the commerce
clause and taxing power, vis a vis. the authority of Congress, in the 1930s may reflect a complete paradigm shift, one that was in the making for half a century. Cf Ackerman, supra note
148, at 1051-57 (The New Deal and rise of the constitutional rediscovery resulting in a redefinition of the relationship between the government and the people.).
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At the same time, we remain committed to an approach to judicial
decisionmaking that rests to some degree on precedent, and in which we
are condemned forever to lack knowledge of the precedential value of a
case on the day of judgment. 155 Unless the courts abandon stare decisis,
abdicate decisionmaking when new facts arise, or vacate their role as forward-looking, problem-solving entities, we must forsake the notion of
history as decisionmaker. Novelty, by definition, undermines historical
determinacy. The past addressed its own problems, not ours.
To reach this conclusion does not require us a fortiori to discard
history as useless. If nothing else, the psychological demands on individual justices render such a conclusion misguided. History is a necessary
tool in the ever present battle against dissonance. The Court needs to
employ history to fulfill its public education function. The logic of the
attack on a precedent-based jurisprudence is flawed; it omits entirely any
discussion of a logical use of history divorced from the critical description of its operation in the generation of doctrine.
The attack on the methodology deflects our attention from two very
real problems we face in this regard, if we assume that the use of history
in law is inevitable. First, we need to be teaching historiography. We
need to demonstrate how to use history, even if it cannot produce "right
answers." Law office history is not only an embarrassing enterprise, it
tends to be profoundly illegitimate: it often misrepresents what we can
know. We are all aware of the disciplinary rule that requires us to disclose "[legal authority in the controlling jurisdiction.., directly adverse
to the position of his client. . ." 56 and yet our use of history flies in the
face of the spirit if not the letter of that mandate.
At an equally fundamental level, we need to recognize a doctrinal
strength of history, as well as its weaknesses. What history can tell us is
when the battle, once raging and of seeming destructive force, is over.
Two examples demonstrate this use. We no longer need to fight the war
for freedom to use contraceptives. At some point in time, the public does
endorse the Court's result, if only through its silent purchasing power,
broadly defined. To the extent that the Court has concluded that certain
powers lie outside its purview, we waste our time and energy fighting.
History has demonstrated the end of a second war in this context: that
the President, subject to the will of Congress if expressed only retrospec155.
156.

M. TUSHNET, supra note 44, at 49.
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, DR 7-106(B)(1) (1980).
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tively, must have the freedom to react to unforeseen international
1 57
contingencies.
These observations have an important legitimating effect on the role
of the Court. If the public now subscribes to the reproductive freedom
made possible by the Griswold decision, several conclusions are possible.
First, the Court interpreted history, its own 15 8 and the republic's, correctly. Moreover, that it has done so justifies nonoriginalist judicial review, at least in the area of individual rights. That justification finds
support in the second conclusion: the public has fulfilled its oversight
function, it has approved the notion of reproductive freedom, at least to
the extent of that decision. That the public has not yet embraced the
more far reaching implications of reproductive choice simply signifies

that history has not yet reached its verdict. It does not mean that our
59
adjudicative framework does not operate.1
Perhaps the bottom line is that, regardless of where we line up on

the immediate issues concerning reproductive rights, for example, we
have no choice but to permit the Court to be wrong, even when the result
of the error causes great, even unnecessary pain.160 If originalism were
workable and operated as even its most sophisticated advocates envision,
the precedent-based system that must adapt to new conditions that alone
create doctrinal change cannot function. The antecedent choice of principles, applied to novel contexts, necessarily undermines the idea of authoritative intent. Thus, one rather paradoxical price that our
commitment to the common-law, historical method exacts is recognition
that public perceptions over time sometimes destroy legal doctrine. A
157. This is by no means a condemnation of the War Powers Resolution, although it does
have implications for justiciability. See Blumoff, supra note 42, at 34-49.
158. Cf Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 535-36.(1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (lack of case
history as the basis for majority opinion and Harlan's basis for dissent).
159. This last comment should not mark me as an apologist. I am merely depicting with
some accuracy a phenomenon that otherwise tends to evoke descriptions based upon ad
hominem attack. Some of the Court's recent decisions, especially in the areas of employment
discrimination and reproductive rights, are, in my opinion, doctrinally, historically, and socially unacceptable. See, eg., Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 109 S. Ct. 3040 (1989)
(statute that prevented use of public employees and facilities in the assistance or performance
of nontherapeutic abortions not unconstitutional); Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 109 S.
Ct. 2363 (1989) (racial harassment occurring during the course of employment falls outside
protection of 42 U.S.C. § 1981). I confess that in the end we may all be nothing but advocate
litigators, although I remain open to deeper descriptions of the methods of law and of judicial
reasoning. See, eg., Winter, TranscendentalNonsense, MetaphoricReasoning, and the Cognitive Stakes for Law, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 1105 (1989).
160. For example, whatever one may think about the abortion issue, it cannot be denied
that the Supreme Court's recent Webster decision will obviously cause pain to those poor
women who, without a public facility for a safe abortion, will return to the dark days of the
back alley. See Webster, 109 S. Ct. 3040.

THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 41

second and related cost is that as we change settled ways of viewing the
"older" case, we displace the extant conceptualization of preexisting precedent; we find the "latent" meaning of the old text.1 61 This cost seems
to be the inescapable product of a dynamic legal system, all of whose
players suffer the same human tendencies.

161.

Dworkin, The Great Abortion Case, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, June 29, 1989, at 51-52.

